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Dinesh, Erlich, Gilfoyle, Jared, Richard, Johan Pouwelse
Abstract—On February 2014, $650.000.000 worth of Bitcoins disappeared. Currently it is unclear whether hackers
or MtGox, the largest Bitcoin exchange, are to be blamed. In either case, the anonymous and unregulated nature of
the Bitcoin system makes it practically impossible for innocent victims to get their money back. We have investigated
the technical possibilities, solutions and implications of introducing a regulatory framework based on redlisting Bitcoin
accounts. Despite numerous proposals, the Bitcoin community has voiced a strong opinion against any form of
regulation. However, most of the discussions were based on speculations rather than facts. We strive to contribute
a scientific foundation to these discussions and illuminate the path to crypto-justice.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
W E discuss the technical possibilities andimplications regarding the regulation of
cryptocurrencies. Furthermore, we provide an
operational implementation of a regulatory
system based on redlisting. We will look at the
first cryptocurrency that has experienced wide
adoption[1], namely Bitcoin. A large part of
the Bitcoin developer community has voiced a
strong opinion against regulation of any form,
stating that it undermines the foundational
principles of Bitcoin. In this article we want to
shed a light on these claims and test whether
they actually hold in practice and to what
extent. Recent events regarding illicit activities
financed with and revolving around Bitcoins
have shown that regulation should be, at the
very least, considered as a possibility to counter
such activities. After discussing the system be-
hind Bitcoin, its implications and principles,
we will look at specific cases in which Bitcoins
were used for illicit purposes and discuss why
regulation, and in particular redlisting, offers
a discussable (partial) solution. Furthermore,
we will also discuss why regulation could offer
viable solutions to societal problems surround-
ing Bitcoin. Following this, we will propose an
implementation on top of the reference Bitcoin
implementation to regulate the Bitcoin system
through redlisting. This implementation will be
examined in depth on its viability and possible
consequences, both on technical level as well
as on foundational level.
2 BITCOIN
There are many cryptocurrencies active cur-
rently, nevertheless we will only use Bitcoin
as the basis for our discussion. We find this
appropriate since Bitcoin is currently the most
widely adopted cryptocurrency on which most
alternative currencies are more or less, if not
entirely, based on.
2.1 Overview
In his publication[2], Satoshi Nakamoto pro-
posed a peer-to-peer payment system called
Bitcoin. In this system, the creation and ex-
change of money is governed by cryptographic
algorithms, hence the name cryptocurrency.
Payments are sent directly from one peer to an-
other without intervention of a financial insti-
tution. Users send payments by broadcasting a
digitally signed message to the Bitcoin network
to request an update of the public ledger, a
sequential record of all transactions. The trans-
action requests are bundled together into a so-
called block. Approximately every 10 minutes
a block is added to the public ledger, which is
referred to as the block chain. Multiple chains
of blocks can exist in the network, but only the
longest chain represents the consensus of what
transactions happened in the network. A pro-
cess called mining is conducted by individual
clients called miners. Mining is the process of
providing computing power in order to verify
and record payments into the block chain. In
exchange, miners receive a fixed reward, which
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2is periodically decreased by 50%. As of this
writing, the reward is set at 25 BTC (Bitcoin)
per block added to the block chain. This is what
creates incentive for users to mine Bitcoins,
which in turn facilitates the maintenance of the
block chain so that Bitcoin owners can transfer
ownership of their Bitcoins to others, i.e. make
payments.
2.2 Technical Description
Bitcoin uses Publickey cryptography, a mathe-
matically proven technique for validating and
verifying signatures. The signatures are created
by the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algo-
rithm which are included at every transaction.
The transactions are hashed (SHA256) together
with a reference to the previous block in the
block chain and a nonce to create a block. The
nonce is used to influence the hash of the block,
as only blocks with hashes of a specific form are
considered valid. Finding a nonce that satisfies
this restriction is what makes Bitcoin mining
a cpu-intensive process. For this reason, the
nonce is often referred to as a proof of work.
The proof of work is what ensures that the
history of transactions is indeed a matter of
consensus, where virtually every CPU gets a
vote. To rewrite the blockchain, one would
have to create a chain that is longer than the
current chain, which would require more CPU
power than the rest of the network.
Each block is broadcasted to the network,
verified at the receiving nodes and then in-
cluded in the blockchain so that spent Bitcoins
cannot be spent twice.
2.3 Foundational Principles
Transactions are validated by a distributed
consensus mechanism. The systems reliability
stems from its cryptographic foundation. Con-
sensus is reached by nodes accepting a newly
mined block into their local block chain. There
is a possibility of disagreement, e.g. different
parts of the network accepting different blocks
into the chain. This leads to branches which
will then compete for unanimous acceptance
in the network. There is no higher authority in
the system than the code itself. As such, the
system eliminates the necessity of traditional
banks, drastically lowering transaction fees.
Bitcoin provides pseudo-anonymity[3] to its
users. The wallets are collections of addresses
which are not linked to ones identity, neither
locally nor in a centralised database. This al-
lows for a system with the same privacy that
comes with cash money. This is a breakthrough
for state-of-the-art digital transaction systems.
2.4 Foundational Volatility
Bitcoin appeals to those skeptical of the role
of central bankers in the economy. As an in-
dependent, stateless currency it bypasses the
involvement of governments and the power of
regulators. After the failure of central banks
to predict and react to the recent financial
crash, this skepticism might be understandable.
However, it must be mentioned that monetary
policy and the vital tools financial regulators
have at their disposal form an important factor
in maintaining a stable economy. Bitcoin uses
a fixed formula to control the money supply
which is a very different concept in that it
has no facilities to detect and react to the rise
and fall of economic cycles[4]. Our economic
history has taught us that the economy is far
from stable and indeed consists of cycles which
should be acted upon. A basic algorithm, with
current technology, is unable to consider the
complexity of human (inter)actions that impact
the state of the economy and prevent necessary
action when crises arise. While Bitcoin has
grown in popularity and it is slowly being
accepted in certain instances of the regular
economy it currently can’t fill the vital role
of a central bank. In order to stabilise the
value of Bitcoin, it might prove beneficial to
consider the implementation of certain regu-
latory measures. Remaining an independent
currency seems to carry a high risk of deval-
uation, which is demonstrated by the incidents
involving Bitcoin discussed below.
3 BITCOIN INCIDENTS
In this section we will present the status quo of
Bitcoin usage in order to conduct or facilitate
illicit activities. Obviously, Bitcoins are not only
3used for such activities. In fact, the majority
of Bitcoin users utilize the payment system for
legal activities. However, for our purpose we
will focus on the illicit activities in this sec-
tion. In particular we want to convey that the
current Bitcoin system makes it very hard[5]
for authorities to counter malicious activities
and apprehend the criminals involved. This
impacts legitimate users as well, because the
integrity of the payment system is constantly
questioned by the public opinion. Furthermore,
the current situation makes it very difficult
to accept the Bitcoin system as a proper and
legitimate payment method as any other non-
digital currency. Therefore, we want to explore
whether governmental regulation of the Bitcoin
network will be beneficial for the system and
the involved legitimate parties.
3.1 Silk Road
Silk Road[6] is an hidden online market, oper-
ating on the Tor network, as a part of the so-
called Deep Web. The Silk Road was launched
in February 2011. Among other goods, the
primary product offered on the Silk Road
are illegal narcotics. When conducted properly,
users are able to browse the website anony-
mously and securely without potential traffic
monitoring. Combined with the anonymous[7]
payment method that Bitcoin facilitates, it is
very difficult for authorities to take control of
these illegal activities. Therefore, very few of
the buyers and sellers have been apprehended.
Although in October 2013 the FBI seized the
Silk Road and arrested some of the websites
operators, a new website called the Silk Road
2.0 has been launched to take the place of the
previous one.
3.2 Mt. Gox
In July 2010 one of the first Bitcoin exchanges
that emerged was Mt. Gox based in Tokyo,
Japan. By 2013 Mt. Gox was handling approxi-
mately 70% of all Bitcoin transactions. In Febru-
ary 2014, Mt. Gox filed for bankruptcy protec-
tion, following the loss[8] of 850.000 BTC ($450
million). As of this writing it is unclear what
actually happened with the coins that were
lost, either unknown hackers have them in
possession, or Mt. Gox has conducted embez-
zlement. In either case, a large part of Bitcoin
owners lost money because of this situation.
The following graph shows the drastic fall of
the value of BTC around the time of the alleged
hack.
To make matters even worse, it is very
difficult to track when and where the stolen
coins were part of a transaction. This makes
it practically impossible for anyone to find the
criminals behind this ordeal. We believe that
in cases such as this, a redlist of rogue Bitcoin
wallets could help to put back pressure on such
activities. Through the redlist, the wallets in
question can be blocked from ever getting a
transaction in the block-chain. This makes it
very difficult for the criminals to move the
money around, i.e. conduct transactions. As
such the stolen coins lose their value. More-
over, with a redlist implemented in the Bitcoin
clients, the miners won’t be facilitating crimi-
nal activities anymore. Nowadays, miners that
keep on mining after they were robbed from
their coins, are in fact facilitating the theft of
their own money. Obviously, this is a problem
that must be dealt with and we believe that a
redlist is potentially a proper solution.
3.3 Prohibition
Russia’s Prosecutor Generals Office has re-
leased the following statement: ”The monitor-
ing of the use of virtual currencies shows an
increasing interest in them, including for the
purpose of money laundering, profit obtained
through illegal means”. The statement further
says: ”Russias official currency is the ruble. The
introduction of other types of currencies and
the issue of money surrogates are banned,”
4meaning that cryptocurrencies (the most popu-
lar of which is bitcoin) cannot be used by Rus-
sian citizens or corporations. Russias Central
Bank (CBR) warned people against using vir-
tual currencies, as they could be tied to gangs
involved in money laundering and terrorist fi-
nancing. Other countries, including China and
Denmark, have also banned cryptocurrencies,
for similar reasons. This reputation problem
seems to be a consequence of the unregulated
nature of Bitcoin. The lack of regulation attracts
criminals and discourages banks, governments
and regulators[9].
4 REGULATION THROUGH REDLISTING
In order for Bitcoins to be accepted as a legiti-
mate payment system, by both governmental
authorities and the general public, it needs
to be offered as a banking service. Just like
existing banks, such a service would need to
comply with existing regulations on national
and international level. Without such compli-
ance it will be difficult for Bitcoin to blend into
the regular economy. This will not benefit the
stability nor the popularity of Bitcoin. Bitcoins
self-regulatory (i.e. unregulated) means of ex-
istence seems unacceptable in todays financial
and judicial framework. Without some form of
governmental regulation, it might be impossi-
ble for Bitcoin to become trustworthy and take
the place of, or even live along-side, current
financial systems. There are several ways in
which one can go about regulating the Bitcoin
system. We will focus on regulation through a
governmentally maintained redlist. This redlist
would contain the hashes which identify wal-
lets that have been involved in criminal activi-
ties. The redlist could be enforced by the miner
client software by simply refusing to mine
transactions involving redlisted accounts. Such
refusal of mining would make the value of the
coins in criminal wallets practically worthless,
since no transactions can be conducted with
them. The only way criminals could enforce the
addition of their transactions to the block-chain
is by owning the majority of all computing
power currently active on the Bitcoin mining
network. The possession of such an amount of
computing power makes it insensible for the
owner(s) to conduct criminal activities since
they can also use that computing power to ac-
quire all the Bitcoin rewards by simply mining.
The ability to generate an enormous amount of
legal income would overshadow the incentive
to conduct criminal activities.
4.1 The Redlist Opposition
There are many outspoken opponents of
redlisting in the Bitcoin community. They
present a few important arguments against the
introduction of redlisting:
• it introduces a central component, namely
the regulatory organ, into the decentral-
ized nature of the Bitcoin system.
• redlisting (or tainting) coins would be sub-
ject to abuse.
• tying a public key to an individual is
technically impossible, making redlisting
tricky.
We recognize all of these problems. However,
we are of opinion that none of these arguments
are strong enough to reject redlisting as a reg-
ulatory measure.
The first argument is often heard first in
a discussion about redlisting in the Bitcoin
world. It can be resolved however by allowing
miners to choose whether or not to abide by
a redlist. The argument against tainting coins
fails to consider that other means of redlisting
might be considered. The solution that we pro-
pose, focusses on redlisting public keys, rather
than coins.
The third argument is an important one,
as it sets a limit of what can be achieved
by redlisting wallets. It is clear that redlisting
alone would not suffice as a solution against
illicit Bitcoin activities, but should be thought
of as a tool in battling them. A tool that is
important to have at one’s disposal.
Considering the above mentioned we intend
to present a redlist implementation in order
to test whether or not the mechanism would
imply a negative impact on Bitcoins founda-
tional principles. This work will also serve as
an exploratory study into the implications of
redlisting systems in crypto currencies. In this
way we hope the discussion regarding regula-
tion will gain fact-based arguments which can
be discussed thoroughly by the community.
55 REDLIST REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
In order to illustrate the technical possibility
of Bitcoin regulation through redlisting, we
will present the Redlist Regulatory Framework.
This framework consists of three parts, namely
a webservice that maintains the redlist, an up-
date of the Bitcoin reference implementation
client to enforce the redlist, and a change in
the Bitcoin GUIMiner to visualize the process
of redlisting. The framework we will present
serves as a demonstrational one in order to
show an discuss the possibilities. The actual
implementation could be different from ours.
5.1 Implementation
The changes to the Bitcoin reference imple-
mentation should be such that the speed of
mining and the security of the application are
not compromised. The implementation is lean,
in the sense that is only comprises about 450
lines added to the reference implementation.
The implementation1 is split into several
parts:
1) retrieval, updating and building of the
redlist in memory
2) checking of new transactions by the miner
against the redlist, to prevent them from
ending up in a block
3) checking of new blocks against the redlist
and forking the blockchain if necessary to
keep the blockchain clean
We will take a look at implementation in the
following paragraphs.
1) Retrieval and building of the Redlist:
The redlist is implemented as a simple c++ api
containing functions to check a single public
key, a transaction or an entire block against the
redlist and return a boolean indicating whether
it should be treated as redlisted.
This API is backed for now by a global
hashset of redlisted public keys, which is build
on first use, and checked for updates at every
next use. The keys themselves are retrieved
from a preset host. Checking for updates can
be lean, by retrieving only the HTTP header
and checking timestamps.
1. https://github.com/DistributedRegulation
Checking a transaction is done by extract-
ing all destinations from a pay-to-pubkey-
hash-transaction and checking them against the
hashset one by one.
Finally, checking a block is done similarly but
extracting all output transactions and checking
them and then extracting all signatures that
release the inputs and checking them as well.
2) Checking new transactions seen by the
miner: The reference miner has a pool of un-
mined transactions. The miner gets a sequence
of transactions from there and checks some
basic requirements, before it tries to mine them
into a block. There we break in to add check
each of the transactions against the global
redlist. Because the redlist is implemented as a
hashset, the amortized runtime for this check
is O(1). If it sees a transaction that contains
redlisted keys it simply does not process it into
a block.
3) Checking incoming blocks: To discourage
lone miners from mining redlisting transactions
for the reward, nodes that do abide by the
redlist try to ignore blocks that contain those
transactions, unless they cannot keep up with
the rate at which that branch is creating blocks.
As described by Nakamoto[2], the nodes need
to switch branches when they find out they
cannot keep up. In order for this to be possible
nodes cannot entirely discard redlisted blocks,
but they have to keep them in the index of
known blocks. The reference implementation
of the node normally automatically switches to
the longest branch in the index.
In order for us to allow a branch to be the
longest branch in the index, but not switch
to it (yet), we changed the comparator that
compares different branches. Once a block gets
into a branch that contains a redlisted transac-
tion, we mark the branch as tainted. When we
compare to branches l and r, we then take into
a account the tainted marker and only treat the
l branch as longer if:
• r is also tainted and l contains more work
than r
• it’s contains n more blocks than r and n is
greater than the switching threshold
Once a node gives up and switches back to
a branch that contains redlisted items, it resets
the marker for that branch.
65.2 End-to-End System Test
The purpose of our tests is to verify both
the correctness of our redlisting mechanism
and the branching behaviour of a network
populated by both the reference and the redlist
version of the Bitcoin client. The test consists
of a sequence of 5 steps, each involving
the mining of a block containing a single
transaction. In this environment, nodes W
and R are the only miners, while A and B
are simply used as transaction endpoints.
We will focus our analysis on the evolution
of the blockchain in W and R. For the sake
of conciseness we will adopt a switching
threshold of 2 blocks. Initially, both nodes
W and R have an identical ’view’ of the
blockchain:
W: [...]-[...]-[...]
ˆ
R: [...]-[...]-[...]
ˆ
With each pair of square parenthesis ([. . . ])
we represent a block, while the triple dots
indicate an unspecified number of transactions
inside a block. The ˆ symbol indicates the block
to which the tip of the blockchain is currently
pointing at.
In the first step, node W sends transaction
T1 to node A and starts mining the block
containing it. This transaction will contain W’s
signature, and will thus be tainted since W’s
address is redlisted. After the block containing
T1 is successfully mined, it will be broadcasted
in the network. Upon accepting it, nodes W, A
and B will set it as the tip of their blockchain,
whereas R will not advance the tip, therefore
creating an artificial fork.
W: [...]-[...]-[...]-[T1]
ˆ
R: [...]-[...]-[...]
ˆ \
[T1]
Step 2 is a repetition of the first one; the
behaviour of the nodes is completely identical
and the result is the addition of a block to the
chain in W and redlisted branch in R.
W: [...]-[...]-[...]-[T1]-[T2]
ˆ
R: [...]-[...]-[...]
ˆ \
[T1]-[T2]
In step 3, node R sends a clean transaction to
node B (T3), mines the block containing it and
broadcasts it into the network. Node W will
receive the block and discard it, since it is not
part of the longest branch. More interesting
is the case that involves R’s blockchain. The
incoming clean block will reference R’s current
tip, therefore being accepted and becoming the
new tip of its blockchain. At the same time,
R will keep the other branch containing the
redlisted blocks in memory.
W: [...]-[...]-[...]-[T1]-[T2]
ˆ
R: [...]-[...]-[...]-[T3]
\ ˆ
[T1]-[T2]
Steps 4 and 5 are again repetitions of step
1. The result is the extension of the redlisted
branch with two extra blocks. While W will
simply advance the tip of it’s blockchain, R will
find itself in the situation in which the redlisted
branch is too further ahead with regard to the
current tip (the branch height difference has
surpassed the switching threshold). R will have
no other choice but to give up its effort to
maintain a clean blockchain, thus switching to
the redlisted branch. This will invalidate the
block containing transaction T3, which will be
returned to the mempool and mined at later
time.
W: [...]-[T1]-[T2]-[T4]-[T5]
ˆ
R: [...]-[T3]
\
[T1]-[T2]-[T4]-[T5]
ˆ
75.3 An Incentive to Use the Redlist
Although we have shown, using the tests, that
the implementation works, it seems that miners
that use the redlist are severely disadvantaged
as long as they do not make up a majority
in the network. That is: every time that they
cannot gain in on the tainted branch, their work
will be discarded; which in turn will mean
that they miss their reward from mining valid
blocks. In this section we show that although
it is true that a risk is attached to abiding by
the redlist, the redlist-abiding miners do not
need a majority for their approach to pay off.
Which leads to the suprising fact that there is
an incentive for miners that only care about
their profit to abide to the redlist from the point
where the redlist abiding miners only make up
35% percent of the network hash rate.
To see how this can be true, we model the
“race” between the tainted and non-tainted
branch as a simple game between two players.
Let player R be the redlist-abiding group, and
I be a pool of miners that are indifferent w.r.t.
the use of the redlist. We assume that all miners
in R use the same redlist and that every block
found by I is tainted. Furthermore, we assume
that the folding-threshold for R is T . From
the Bitcoin protocol if follows that the folding-
threshold for I is 1, i.e. they switch to the other
branch as soon as it becomes the longest one.
Lastly, let p be the probability that R finds the
next block, such that q = 1−p is the probability
that I finds the next block; and let p be linear in
the relative size of R. Now we are interested in
the probability P [R wins] that R does not need
to fold it’s branch.
The game outlined above is known widely
as the gambler’s ruin problem[10]. We interpret
the fold threshold as an amount of starting
cash for each player. The probability of interest
then corresponds with the probability that the
player is ruined. Figure 1 shows the probability
P [R wins] against the relative size of R. It
can be seen that for the relatively low fold-
threshold of 3, for a relative size of R of 35%,
R already wins 50% of the time. And when R
occupies 50% of the miners, they can always
win the game.
Another interesting probability is P [I folds].
Fig. 1. Probability that the redlist-abiding pool
prevails against it’s relative size
I needs to fold and give up at least one block
whenever I finds the first block, but R wins
the race. Figure 2 shows this probability, again
against the relative size of R. We can see that
with 35% of the miners abiding by the redlist,
I already loses more than 15% of it’s rewards.
This gives an incentive for indifferent miners
to adopt the redlist early.
Fig. 2. Probability that the indifferent miners
need to give up at least one block
5.4 Bitcoin Attack Based on the Redlist Im-
plementation
There are several known attacks to the Bitcoin
system[11]; in this section we describe an ex-
8ample attack that might be conducted if our
implementation of the Bitcoin client would be
adopted. This attack assumes non-unanimous
consensus on the redlist. The attack shows that
a too simplistic approach would be naive and
gives us a handle on what future work is still
needed.
We consider the following, possibly over-
simplified, scenario:
• Miners are split in two groups: A and B.
• A has adopted redlist Ra, whereas B has
adopted redlist Rb.
• Let A be the strongest group, meaning that
if A and B chase each-other for the longest
chain, A will win.
Now consider a Bitcoin public key p, which
is on Rb but not on Ra, owned by an attacker
Q. Q can now shut B out of the network: i.e.
keep them busy on work that will never make
it into the block-chain.
Q can do so by creating transactions Tq
using his private key. Miners from A will
create blocks containing Tq, whereas miners
from B will reject Tq and mine blocks
where Tq is NOT included. This introduces
a fork in the chain and A and B will both
attempt to uphold their chain for x blocks.
Because A is the strongest group, B will loose
and switch to A after those x blocks are mined.
A: [...]-[Tq]-[...]-[...]
\
B: [...]-[...]-[...]
If another transaction from Q is then in the
network, the attack will start from the begin-
ning. As such, Q can occupy B with useless
work.
It seems in line with Bitcoin’s idea of ”con-
sensus” that the redlist with the largest backing
group ”wins”, i.e. consensus about what trans-
actions should be included in the blockchain is
reached by votes weighted according to CPU
power. But this attack exposes a vulnerability
that goes beyond that, as the largest group
can keep a minority from doing any work. It
exploits the fact that miners will attempt to
uphold their chain to effectively ban them from
the pool of miners that contribute to the longest
chain.
Two solutions can be considered:
1) All miners accept the same redlist.
2) Miners can pick their redlist, but do not
reject blocks containing redlisted transac-
tions.
The second option falls when we recognize
that there will always be an incentive for min-
ers to mine redlisted transactions; and there
only need be one in order for a transaction to
end up in the block-chain. An attack such as
this would be an incentive to adopt one single
redlist. Although we leave it as future work if
this attack could be countered appropriately.
6 CONCLUSION
In this article we have discussed the Bit-
coin cryptocurreny, its foundations, implica-
tions and status quo. We have debated several
problems that currently surround Bitcoin and
we have proposed to open up the discussion
on whether regulation could and/or should
be a solution to some of these issues. An ini-
tial implementation has been created (based
on the Bitcoin reference implementation) that
realises a redlisting mechanism. We have also
presented an analysis of our implementation
and the probabilities tied to its effectiveness.
Surprisingly we have found that a mere 35%
of the Bitcoin miners abiding the redlist is
sufficient to enforce the mechanism. As such,
Bitcoin will have gained some regulatory mea-
sures which can be used to counter some of the
problems mentioned in this article. The ques-
tion still remains whether this is indeed some-
thing that would benefit the Bitcoin system and
community as a whole. Is the cure worse than
the disease? Further work should be conducted
in order to test and verify the workings of
the proposed redlisting mechanism. Also other
solutions should be investigated and weighed
against our results. We hope that this paper
can provide fruitful ground for a (fact-based)
discussion about the future of Bitcoin.
7 FUTURE WORK
We provide a basis for experimentation and
discussion, meaning that experimentation will
9have to be conducted before any fact based
conclusions can be reached about the viability
of this solution. Some important issues at hand
are:
• Can any other attacks on a redlist-based
implementation be thought of and can
these attacks be countered appropriately?
• Assuming adaptation of our implementa-
tion, is is viable to prevent the outflow
of Bitcoins from a redlisted wallet fast
enough to prevent the owner from obfus-
cating the money before the network can
respond?
• Is a network with partial adaptation stable
and fair?
We leave this for those that are willing to
experiment with our implementation.
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